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RESUMEN
La historiografía escrita en inglés sobre la Rebelión Naval en Brasil de 1893 a
1894 ha hecho hincapié en el papel diplomático y naval que las potencias
extranjeras jugaron para poner fin a la revuelta. Según esta aproximación, el
gobierno brasileño del Mariscal Floriano Peixoto fue débil y no pudo controlar los
acontecimientos. En realidad, fue la combinación de firmeza y habilidad
diplomática mostrada por Peixoto y su gobierno más que la actividad de las
potencias extranjeras, incluídos los Estados Unidos, el factor constante y más
influyente que convirtió la Revuelta Naval en un enfrentamiento desigual e hizo que
fuera una cuestión de tiempo el que los rebeldes capitularan y fracasara la rebelión.
Palabras clave: Brasil, revuelta naval, diplomacia, gobierno de Peixoto,
historiografía.
ABSTRACT
Historical writing in English on the Brazilian Naval Revolt of 1893-1894 has
stressed the vital diplomatic and naval role that the foreign powers played in bringing
about the failure of the revolt. According to this view, the Brazilian government
headed by Marshal Floriano Peixoto was weak and at the mercy of events beyond its
control. In fact, it was the combination of firmness and skillful diplomacy shown by
Floriano and his government rather than the activities of the foreign powers,
including the United States, that was the constant and most influential factor which
turned the Naval Revolt into an unequal contest and meant that it was only a matter
of time before the rebels capitulated and brought their rebellion to an end.
Key words: Brazil, naval revolt, diplomacy, Peixoto Government,
historiography.
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On 6 September 1893 Admiral Custódio José de Melo seized
command of the entire fleet of Brazilian warships stationed in the bay of
Rio de Janeiro and demanded the resignation of the head of the federal
government, Vice-President Floriano Vieira Peixoto, under threat of naval
bombardment of the city. Contrary to Custódio’s expectation, however,
Floriano refused to resign. Despite his complete lack of available naval
power to challenge Custódio at sea, the Vice-President acted vigorously in
declaring a state of martial law and in ordering the army to occupy, fortify
and guard the harbour and its landing-places. Consequently, what had
been originally intended as no more than a brief military coup became
transformed into the Brazilian Naval Revolt, a prolonged naval siege of
Rio lasting from September 1893 to March 18941. Although the revolt
arose directly from Brazilian internal politics and especially interservice
rivalries between the army and the navy2, most historical accounts of the
episode have preferred to examine and highlight the significance of the
diplomatic and military role assumed by the leading foreign powers,
particularly the United States. «Rio was too important to be left to the
Brazilians», sums up a recent study by Steven Topik and he adds: «the
Great Powers felt it their duty and right to defend their commerce and
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1 Floriano’s predecessor, President Manoel Deodoro da Fonseca, had resigned in
almost identical circumstances less than two years previously in November 1891.
Floriano replaced Deodoro as head of state, but chose to retain the title of Vice-President
rather than submit himself to a special presidential election. The most detailed account of
the Naval Revolt is  FREIRE, Felisbello: História da Revolta de 6 de Setembro de 1893.
Editora Universidade de Brasília. Brasília, 1982. This is a reprint of a work originally
published in 1896. For a concise description of the military aspects see CLOWES, William
L.: Four Modern Naval Campaigns. Unit Library. London, 1902, pp. 191-231.
2 On interservice rivalries see HAHNER, June E.: Civilian-Military Relations in
Brazil, 1889-1898. University of South Carolina Press. Columbia, South Carolina, 1969.
3 TOPIK, Steven C.: Trade and Gunboats: The United States and Brazil in the Age
of Empire. Stanford University Press. Stanford, California, 1996, p. 132. The writings of
Walter LaFeber have been notable in stressing the particularly prominent diplomatic role
of the United States and that country’s capacity to affect, if not determine the course and
outcome of the revolt. In his view, the American secretary of state, Walter Q. Gresham,
«did not hesitate to use United States warships to defeat the insurgents and maintain in
power the pro-American established Brazilian government». See LAFEBER, Walter: The
New Empire: An Interpretation of American Expansion. Cornell University Press. Ithaca,
New York, 1963, p. 210. Among the many articles dealing specifically with American
diplomacy see  MCCLOSKEY, Michael B.: «The United States and the Brazilian Naval
Revolt, 1893-1894», The Americas, 2, 1946, pp. 296-321; LAFEBER, Walter: «United
citizens3». In reality, however, the foreign powers were never in control of
events taking place at Rio and found themselves pursuing a reactive rather
than a pro-active policy. Moreover, their actions were considerably
affected and constrained by the firm attitude and skilful diplomacy
displayed by Floriano and his government throughout the revolt. The
importance of this factor has been largely neglected by historians4.
Brazil had only recently become a republic in 1889 after over-
throwing a monarchy which had ruled the country for most of the
nineteenth-century. The foreign powers were dismayed by another major
political crisis in Brazil and from the outset disclaimed any intention of
taking sides in the Naval Revolt. The desire to remain detached, however,
was outweighed by humanitarian and economic concerns. Citing the right
to enforce international rules of civilized behaviour, the foreign powers
wished to prevent indiscriminate bombardment of a capital city which
contained a considerable civilian population and was regarded as virtually
defenceless. There was also anxiety that Brazil’s leading port would be
closed with consequent disruption and damage to commerce with the
outside world. In attempting to secure their objectives the foreign powers
used diplomatic pressure and the implicit threat of «gunboat diplomacy».
Military intervention was made feasible because Rio was such a natural
and popular stopping-off point for world shipping in the South Atlantic
that a number of warships from Britain, France, Italy and Portugal were
coincidentally in the bay at the start of the revolt. They were subsequently
joined by ships from Germany and notably five warships from the United
Joseph Smith Brazilian Diplomacy and Foreign Intervention in the Brazilian Naval Revolt, 1893-94
119 Revista Complutense de Historia de América
2000, 26: 117-134
States Depression Diplomacy and the Brazilian Revolution, 1893-1894», Hispanic
American Historical Review, 40, 1960, pp. 107-18; VIVIAN, James F.: «United States
Policy during the Brazilian Naval Revolt 1893-94: The Case for American Neutrality»,
American Neptune, 41, 1981, pp. 245-61; CALHOUN, Charles W.: «American Policy
toward the Brazilian Naval Revolt of 1893-1894: A Re-examination», Diplomatic
History, 4, 1981, pp. 39-56. For a Brazilian view which agrees that the Naval Revolt was
resolved «more in Washington than in Rio de Janeiro» see MONIZ BANDEIRA: Presença
dos Estados Unidos no Brasil. Editora Civilização Brasileira. Rio de Janeiro, 1973, p.
144. British diplomacy is examined in SMITH, Joseph: «Britain and the Brazilian Naval
Revolt of 1893-94», Journal of Latin American Studies, 2, 1970, pp. 175-98.
4 The balance has already been partly redressed in the excellent article of VIVIAN,
«United States Policy during the Brazilian Naval Revolt». See also the work of Brazilian
scholars in CORR A. DA COSTA, Sérgio: A Diplomacia do Marechal: Intervenção
Estrangeira na Revolta da Armada. Editora Universidade de Brasília. Brasília, 1979, and
BUENO, Clodoaldo: A República e Sua Política Exterior (1889 a 1902). Editora UNESP.
São Paulo, 1995.
States, four of which were powerful armoured cruisers. In fact, the
American squadron that assembled at Rio in January 1894 was superior to
the whole rebel fleet in terms of total firepower and armour.
Supported by this substantial naval presence, the foreign powers
sought to place restrictions on the military activities of both the
government and the rebels. The stated purpose was neither to end the
revolt nor prohibit actual hostilities but to limit firing upon the city
especially in the area of the docks so that foreign merchant ships could
exercise their legal right to conduct normal commercial business. A direct
clash between the foreign and rebel warships was avoided until 29
January 1894 when the American naval squadron, commanded by
Admiral Andrew Benham, briefly exchanged shots as it successfully
escorted an American merchant ship safely to the docks. By refusing to
allow any interference with American shipping, Benham effectively
prevented the rebels from establishing a legal blockade of the port of Rio.
The intervention was applauded in the United States where Congress
quickly approved a resolution expressing pleasure «at the prompt and
energetic action» of Admiral Benham5. «We sent to Brazil a fleet which
by its presence constituted the one formidable naval demonstration in
foreign waters in our recent history, and it ended that rebellion and
restored peace to Brazil», later remarked Senator Anthony Higgins of
Delaware6. In Rio, however, the immediate response was quite different.
The British minister at Rio, Hugh Wyndham, reported that Benham’s
action had «produced a bad effect on shore and afloat amongst the
Brazilians as it is looked upon as a blow to the prestige of both parties; a
humiliation to the insurgents, and an open exemplification of the
powerlessness of the government in the Bay7».
The Brazilian Naval Revolt provides, therefore, an illustration of how
the nations of Latin America at the close of the nineteenth century were
subjected to humiliating treatment not only by the European powers but
also by the United States8. The inferior status accorded to Brazil was
demonstrated at the very beginning of the revolt in September 1893 when
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5 See 53rd Congress, 2nd Session, House Report n.º 391.
6 Congressional Record, 53rd Congress, 3rd Session, 2 March 1895, p. 3109.
7 Wyndham to Rosebery, n.º 48, 5 February 1894, London, Public Record Office,
Foreign Office [hereafter cited as FO] 13/724.
8 For examples of European «chastisement» of Latin American countries see
PERKINS, Dexter: The Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907. Johns Hopkins University Press.
Baltimore, 1937, pp. 121-2.
the representatives of the foreign powers in Rio behaved in a
condescending and superior manner towards both the Brazilian
government and the naval rebels. On the morning after Custódio’s seizure
of the fleet, Floriano invited the diplomatic corps, consisting of the
representatives of Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the
United States, to a conference at the presidential palace to discuss
collective measures to safeguard merchant shipping. The British minister
and doyen of the foreign diplomatic corps, Hugh Wyndham, expressed the
common opinion of his colleagues when he described the request as a ruse
to make it appear that the foreign powers were siding with the
government. The diplomats, consequently, delivered a snub to Floriano by
unanimously refusing the invitation on the grounds that to accept would
be a departure from the standing instructions from their governments to
maintain a policy of strict neutrality in the internal affairs of Brazil9. But
neutrality did not mean inaction. Instead of going to the presidential
palace, the foreign diplomats consulted their respective naval
commanders and over the next few weeks prepared a series of formal
notes which were presented to both Floriano and Custódio. The notes
stated that merchant ships flying foreign flags should continue to go about
their business in the bay and would be protected by their respective
national warships. It was also hoped that shelling of the capital would not
take place, but should Custódio intend to do so, he was requested to give
up to 48 hours prior warning to the foreign naval commanders in order
that ships could be moved away from the line of fire10. To reduce the risk
of naval bombardment and also to maintain what they regarded as their
even-handed stance, the diplomatic representatives undertook to seek an
equivalent assurance from Floriano that no new offensive fortifications
would be erected within the city. Should serious fighting erupt and
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9 Wyndham to Rosebery, 10 September 1893, FO 13/705. The opinion of the
foreign diplomats is explained by the Portuguese minister in Conde de PAÇO D’ARCOS:
Missão Diplomática do Conde do Paço D’Arcos no Brasil, 1891 a 1893. Lisbon, 1974,
pp. 257-64.
10 Wyndham to Rosebery, n.º 122, 18 September 1893, FO 13/705. The German
diplomatic and naval representatives did not join the concerted action on the grounds
that the presentation of notes represented a departure from the policy of neutrality.
Indeed, the notes were ambiguous in that they concentrated on sparing Rio from
bombardment and did not seek to extend their restrictions to the city of Niterói at the
other side of the bay. Niterói was subsequently attacked on a number of occasions during
the revolt.
disorder break out on shore a contingency plan was devised to land
marines to secure the protection and evacuation of foreign nationals and
their property11.
Although the European powers and the United States claimed to be
neutral, the notes presented to Floriano and Custódio constituted
external interference in the revolt because they clearly sought to restrict
the military activities of both sides. They also represented a direct
infringement of Brazil’s national sovereignty and provoked local
resentment12. The controversy over the notes, however, was reduced
because they unintentionally proved to be helpful to the government.
While the arrogant refusal of the diplomatic corps to attend the
conference at the presidential palace was interpreted as a humiliating
set-back to Floriano13 he could hardly have expected the foreign powers
to take his side openly and compensate him for his lack of a navy by
using their ships in the harbour against the rebels. On the other hand,
Floriano’s request had fortuitously engaged the foreign representatives
in a round of diplomatic activity which had contributed to preventing
Custódio from taking advantage of the element of surprise that the
revolt had initially possessed and proceeding with his threat to launch an
early assault upon the city. «Although the foreign ministers and ships of
war have not interfered in this Revolution», remarked Wyndham, «I
consider that the presence of foreign ships of war has had a most
salutary effect and may have prevented a serious bombardment of the
town»14. In its first reporting of the revolt The Times was critical of the
«not infrequent revolutions in Brazil» and adopted a forthright tone
endorsing the possible use of gunboat diplomacy. «The foreign admirals,
acting on the initiative of the French commander», declared an editorial,
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11 The Latin American diplomats in Rio were pointedly not consulted over the
contingency plan. See BUENO, 1995, p. 176.
12 The Floriano government complained that the foreign powers were engaging in
«unofficial intervention». See PAÇO D’ARCOS, 1974, p. 275. For the view that the foreign
powers were treating Brazil as they would deal with «an internal or tribal convulsion» in
an African or Asian country see BUENO, 1995, p. 176.
13 Floriano informed the foreign diplomats that he regarded their refusal of his
invitation as support for the rebels. See MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES: Relatorio
Apresentado ao Vice-Presidente da República dos Estados Unidos do Brazil pelo
Alexandre Cassiano do Nascimento em Maio de 1894. Imprensa Nacional. Rio de Janeiro,
1894, p. 5.
14 Wyndham to Rosebery, 10 September 1893, FO 13/705.
«have decided to prevent the threatened bombardment»15. On 13
September the rebel ships did spontaneously engage in a limited amount
of firing at military fortifications close to the docks, but pressure from
the foreign naval commanders persuaded Custódio to desist from
implementing his announced intention to bombard the city on 18
September. Two weeks later, however, the recurrence of sporadic firing
from the rebels prompted the naval commanders to write to Custódio
and formally state that «they would oppose by force if necessary, any
act of hostility directed against the city of Rio de Janeiro»16. Although
they claimed to be pursuing a policy of non-interference, the foreign
powers were essentially aiding Floriano by threatening to use their naval
forces against the rebels.
While Custódio attempted to comply with the wishes of the foreign
naval commanders, Floriano ignored the requests of the foreign
diplomats not to strengthen the city’s fortifications. In fact, the
government’s military weakness and Rio’s vulnerability to attack had
been exaggerated. Just after the outbreak of the revolt Wyndham noted
that the town «can hardly be considered a defenceless town as the quays
are lined with troops and guns». He later reported information from the
British naval commander, Captain W. M. Lang, that rather than a
dismantling of the artillery batteries on shore «they [the naval
commanders] had observed with much astonishment that not only had no
such measures been adopted but that fresh earthworks were under
construction, and that more guns were being mounted, thereby giving the
insurgent admiral the pretext to open fire upon the town»17. The foreign
diplomats duly conveyed the «great astonishment» of their naval
colleagues to the Brazilian foreign office and pointed out that, instead of
being removed, the existing fortifications were being strengthened and
extended. Floriano assertively replied, however, that the naval
commanders were «not well-informed». Furthermore, the artillery
batteries in question were intended to be purely defensive so that his
government could not therefore accept what he described as merely an
«invitation» to remove them18. The Portuguese minister, the Conde de
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15 The Times [London], 9 September 1893.
16 The note is cited in BUENO, 1995, p. 177. For Custódio’s response see CORR A DA
COSTA, 1979, p. 38.
17 Wyndham to Rosebery, 10 September and n.º 143, 9 October 1893, FO 13/705.
18 See MINISTÉRIO DAS RELAÇÕES EXTERIORES, 1894, pp. 5-7.
Paço D’Arcos, lamented that Floriano’s «reluctance to disarm» made
diplomatic negotiations «extremely difficult»19.
In effect, the Vice-President’s deliberate non-cooperation compelled
the foreign naval commanders to withdraw their threat to oppose
Custódio’s bombardment of Rio. «We cannot», summed up a British
Foreign Office official, «unduly interfere to prevent the insurgent ships
from firing upon batteries which are being constructed for the express
purpose of sinking their ships»20. Although Custódio refrained from
retaliating with a full-scale bombardment, his ships began to engage in
what became a frequent exchange of firing with the troops and
fortifications on land. «Many persons are injured daily in this city as a
result of the rifle and machine-gun fire», gloomily reported Charles
Akers, the Special Correspondent of The Times21. The loss of life,
however, did not lead to foreign military intervention. Such an operation
was neither militarily feasible nor sensible. Indeed, it might have resulted
in substantial foreign casualties because Floriano was reported to have
defiantly declared that any landing by foreign marines on Brazilian soil
would be met with «bullets»22. Moreover, as Wyndham privately confided
to a local British businessman, even if Floriano and the rebel leaders were
somehow removed, «there would be no guarantee that another civil war
would not break out immediately afterwards»23.
Despite Floriano’s bridling against alleged external interference, the
policy pursued by the foreign representatives of insisting that trade be
allowed to continue in the bay was actually advantageous to his cause
because it prevented the rebels from closing the port and establishing a
legal blockade24. So long as a safe landing-place for goods could not be
secured, commercial activities were placed at risk and were often
conducted in extremely difficult and hazardous circumstances. «Business
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19 PAÇO D’ARCOS, 1974, p. 282.
20 Minute on Wyndham to Rosebery, n.º 31, 2 October, 1893, FO 13/707.
21 The Times [London], 28 November 1893.
22 See BUENO, Clodoaldo: «A Diplomacia da “Consolidação”: A Intervenção
Estrangeira na Revolta da Armada (1893/94)», História, São Paulo, 3, 1984, p. 46.
23 Wyndham to Rosebery, n.º 260, 20 December 1893, FO 13/707. Wyndham also
pointed out that, if it was to be effective, foreign military intervention could not just be
limited to Rio and might have to be extended to southern Brazil.
24 The Brazilian diplomat, Joaquim Nabuco, considered that the policy of the
foreign naval commanders was of «immense advantage» to Floriano. See NABUCO.
Joaquim: A Intervenção Estrangeira durante A Revolta de 1893. Companhia Editora
Nacional. São Paulo, 1939, p. 48.
here is suffering greatly», remarked Charles Akers25. In fact, it was the
foreign merchants and shipping interests who suffered most and
complained the loudest. The foreign naval commanders found themselves
in an acute dilemma. Unless they were prepared to intervene actively they
could do nothing to prevent injury to foreign nationals and their property
from the firing that regularly took place between the rebel ships and the
harbour fortifications. However, as the American commander, Captain
Henry Picking explained, any forceful action must inevitably assist one
side against the other and would be construed as a departure from the
policy of noninterference in the domestic affairs of Brazil26. Picking’s
cautious attitude was shared by his British colleague, Captain Lang, who
similarly stated that «it was impossible to grant protection against the
crossfire of the government and insurgent forces». To do so would have
meant risking the lives of his officers and men27. Far from being in control
of events at Rio, the foreign powers had to endure what the British prime
minister, William Gladstone described as «a lamentable state of affairs»
which would not change so long as «the two contending parties are firing
at each other»28.
Throughout the confusion of the Naval Revolt the single constant theme
was the insistence of Floriano that he represented the one and only legal
government of Brazil. The naval rebels were denounced not only as traitors
to the Brazilian nation, but in terms of international law they were declared
to be pirates and should be treated as such. The official line was faithfully
relayed to Washington from the American minister at Rio, Thomas S.
Thompson, in his first telegram mentioning the revolt. «On September 6»,
he reported, «a note was received from the foreign minister informing me
that a part of the squadron had revolted, manifesting hostility against the
legal government of Brazil»29. As Thompson’s telegram indicates, despite
the snub to Floriano’s invitation to a meeting on 7 September and the effort
to appear to be neutral, the foreign diplomatic corps could not avoid being
in regular professional contact with officials of the foreign ministry. By
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25 The Times [London], 28 November 1893.
26 Picking to Herbert, 28 December 1893, Washington, National Archives, Records
of the Department of the Navy, Record Group 45, area 4, microfilm roll no. 26.
27 Lang to the Admiralty, 17 December 1893, FO 13/733.
28 Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, vol. 20, 2 January 1894, p. 656.
29 Thompson to Gresham, 6 September 1893, Washington, National Archives,
Records of the Department of State, Record Group [hereafter cited as RG] 59, Brazil,
Dispatches, vol. 54.
contrast, the naval rebels lacked similar diplomatic status and were
compelled to resort to sending their official communications to the ranking
foreign naval commanders in the bay who passed these on to their
respective diplomatic officials in Rio30. Any departure from this convoluted
procedure was seized upon by the Brazilian government and quickly
brought to the attention of the official’s own government.
The most celebrated incident involved a senior American naval
officer. Shortly after arriving at Rio on 19 October to take up command
of the American naval squadron, Commodore Oscar Stanton ordered an
exchange of salutes and visits with Custódio. The action appeared
harmless. «We are advised that these calls were of the briefest character
and were devoid of all political interest», noted the Rio News31. However,
no other foreign commander had acted so openly in this way and Floriano
sought to exploit the incident to the full. The result was a diplomatic
furore in which Floriano accused the American commander of deliberate
collusion with the rebels. The Brazilian minister at Washington, Salvador
de Mendonça, was cabled to make an immediate protest. Stanton was
soon recalled by the Navy Department and later reprimanded for «a grave
error of judgment»32. The American press interpreted the recall as an
indication that the Cleveland administration was sympathetic to Floriano.
However, the abrupt dismissal of a high-ranking American naval officer
at the request of a foreign government was a notable and most unusual
event in its own right. It was certainly not an initiative emanating from
Washington and was a direct consequence of Floriano’s firmness and
insistence that his government be recognized as the sole legitimate
government of Brazil. In addition, Floriano’s supporters shrewdly used
the news of Stanton’s recall to organize a public demonstration in Rio
praising Cleveland’s «noble and correct attitude»33.
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30 The presentation of notes to Custódio by the foreign naval commanders did not
signify diplomatic recognition. «We in no way recognized Admiral de Mello as a
belligerent», stated the British minister. See Wyndham to Rosebery, n.º 122, 18
September 1893, FO 13/705.
31 Rio News, 31 October 1893.
32 Salvador de Mendonça a Itamarati, n.º 1, 23 de dezembro de 1894, quoted in
MENDONÇA AZEVEDO, José Afonso: Vida e Obra de Salvador de Mendonça. Ministério
das Relações Exteriores. Rio de Janeiro, 1971, pp. 271-2. See also VIVIAN, 1981, p. 253.
Captain Henry Picking was placed in temporary command of the American squadron
until the arrival of Admiral Andrew Benham in early-January 1894.
33 Rio News, 7 November 1893.
The furore over Stanton is often regarded by historians as an
unfortunate but an isolated incident which was terminated satisfactorily
and did not occur again. In fact, Floriano elicited a similar response from
the British government even before Stanton had arrived in Rio. When it
was rumoured in September that Hugh Wyndham was personally
sympathetic to the rebels, the Brazilian foreign ministry cabled a
telegram to its minister in London instructing him to raise the matter
immediately at the Foreign Office. Within 24 hours the British foreign
secretary, Lord Rosebery, sent the following telegram to Wyndham:
«Brazilian Govt. have telegraphed privately here that they suspect you of
being favorable to Mello. This of course I do not credit, but be careful to
avoid giving the slightest ground for such a charge. You should be
absolutely neutral»34. On receiving the message Wyndham speedily
visited the Brazilian foreign minister to give a personal denial of the
reports35. The sensitivities of the Brazilian government also extended far
beyond Rio. For example, a few weeks later the foreign ministry
complained to Wyndham that the British vice-consul in the northeastern
state of Ceará was «mixing in politics». Brazilian diplomacy was,
therefore, highly effective in reminding the local foreign representatives
that their behaviour was subject to close scrutiny36.
Another important instrument of Floriano’s policy was strict
censorship of the local press. In fact, the Rio press was generally hostile
to foreigners during the revolt. «Most unjustifiable attacks have been
made on foreign ministers and commanders of foreign warships by the
portion of the press in favour of Marshal Peixoto», remarked Charles
Akers37. The only English-language weekly in Rio, the Rio News, was
accused of anti-government bias and compelled to cease publication. In
addition to its influence over the press, the government controlled
telegraphic communications transmitted to and from Rio. While foreign
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34 Foreign Office to Wyndham, n.º 20, 6 October 1893, FO 13/708. For the telegram
instructing Sousa Corrêa to raise the matter see Carlos de Carvalho a Sousa Corrêa, 6 de
outubro de 1893, Rio de Janeiro, Missões Diplomáticas Brasileiras, Ofícios, Arquivo
Histórico do Itamarati [herafter cited as AHI] 217/2/3.
35 Wyndham to Rosebery, n.º 147, 11 October 1893, FO 13/705.
36 Wyndham to Rosebery, n.º 14, 13 November 1893, FO 13/706.
37 The Times [London], 18 December 1893. The Portuguese representatives and
residents in Rio were a particular target of criticism and denunciation. See HAHNER, June:
«Floriano Peixoto, Brazil’s «Iron Marshal»: A Re-evaluation», The Americas, 31, 1975,
p. 263. The Portuguese minister lamented that press criticism made his position
«untenable». See PAÇO D’ARCOS, 1974, p. 333.
representatives and press correspondents could see for themselves what
was happening in the bay and on shore at Rio, they had to rely upon
official government reports for the most recent news of developments in
the rest of the country. This information was significant because armed
opposition to the federal government had already broken out in various
parts of the republic, most notably in the southern state of Rio Grande do
Sul38. Custódio had links with the separatist forces fighting in the south
and sought a formal alliance. On 24 October he announced the formation
of a provisional rebel government in the southern state of Santa Catarina
and requested diplomatic recognition from the foreign powers. The
Brazilian government ensured that very little was known about the
provisional government and only released information to the press that
was extremely negative in tone.
The success of Floriano’s government in managing the news was
evident in the material contained in the dispatches sent from Rio by the
American minister, Thomas Thompson. Thompson was particularly
impressionable. A journalist from California, he was a political
appointment and a novice in the diplomatic world. He was also new to
Brazil and had arrived in Rio only a few days before the Naval Revolt
occurred. On the crucial issue of whether the United States should
recognize the provisional government formed by the rebels and in doing
so grant them belligerent rights to enforce a legal blockade at Rio,
Thompson simply and uncritically passed on information given to him by
the Brazilian government. Two days before Custódio’s request for
recognition and at a time when the British correspondent, Charles Akers,
was describing the fighting in Rio as «a very half-hearted affair» in which
neither side was making much headway, the American minister
telegraphed Secretary of State Walter Q. Gresham to report that the
position of the insurgents in the harbour at Rio was «becoming
desperate». Using information that he could only have been given from
official sources, Thompson subsequently stated that the Uruguayan
government had refused to receive a deputation sent by the rebels
operating in southern Brazil39. Gresham duly replied that recognition by
the United States of the provisional government was not justified and that
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38 See LOVE, Joseph L.: Rio Grande do Sul and Brazilian Regionalism, 1882-1930.
Stanford University Press. Stanford, California, 1971.
39 The Times [London], 17 November 1893; Thompson to Gresham, telegrams, 22
and 24 October 1893, RG 59, Brazil, Dispatches, vol. 55.
it would be «an unfriendly act toward Brazil»40. Thompson’s subsequent
dispatches continued to be dismissive of the rebels. On 9 November he
stated that they were «in the spirit of desperation» and a day later «latest
reports» were cited which indicated that Floriano’s troops had defeated
the rebel forces in Santa Catarina41. «Latest reports» referred to
statements received from the Brazilian foreign ministry. In fact, the
American minister was well aware that the news was being manipulated
and that he might have been deliberately misinformed. In one telegram he
noted «what appears to be a disastrous defeat of the revolutionary forces
in the South» and revealingly added: «But, as I have before stated,
information from the outside comes entirely through agencies controlled
by the Government and is no doubt often colored in its interests»42.
As part of its strategy to win over opinion to its cause, the Brazilian
government frequently alluded to the monarchist motives of the rebels.
The charge that the rebels intended to destroy the republic and restore the
monarchy was designed to win support primarily within Brazil, but it
was realized that it might also influence the attitudes of the foreign
powers, especially the United States. Thompson duly conformed to the
American anti-monarchical tradition in that he was quick to see the
spectre of monarchist plots. As early as 3 October he recounted a private
conversation in which the Minister of Finance assured him that the
government possessed «indubitable proof of intention on the part of the
revolutionists to reestablish a monarchy»43. No doubt, in an attempt by
the Brazilians to incite Anglo-American rivalry, Thompson was later
informed that the British were directly implicated in the monarchist
threat and were secretly collaborating with the Germans to provide
financial aid to Custódio44. The allegations of British intrigues were
repeated almost two months later on 13 December and resulted in
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40 Gresham to Thompson, telegram, 25 October 1894, ibidem This decision was
announced on the very same day that Gresham was meeting with Salvador to respond to
Brazilian complaints over the conduct of Commodore Stanton. It would be logical to
infer that the reference to an «unfriendly act to Brazil» meant, in effect, the desire of the
United States not to upset Floriano’s government any further. See MENDONÇA AZEVEDO,
1971, p. 271.
41 Thompson to Gresham, telegram, 9 November and n.º 68, 10 November 1893,
1893, RG 59, Brazil, Dispatches, vol. 55.
42 Thompson to Gresham, n.º 141, 26 January 1894, ibidem, vol. 56.
43 Thompson to Gresham, telegram, October 3, 1893, ibidem, vol. 55.
44 Thompson to Gresham, telegram, 22 October 1893, ibidem.
Thompson immediately cabling Gresham to report that the Brazilian
foreign minister claimed to possess proof in the form of an affidavit
stating that British naval forces were giving material support to the rebels
in order to bring about the restoration of the empire. It was no
coincidence that the Brazilian government decided to reveal the existence
of the affidavit at a critical time only days after Admiral Luís Felipe
Saldanha da Gama had joined the revolt on the side of the rebels.
Saldanha replaced Custódio as commander of the rebel fleet and
announced his intention of instituting a more vigorous prosecution of the
naval siege45.
In addition to exploiting the anti-monarchical and anti-British attitude
of Thompson46, the Brazilian government also directly sought to influence
American policy and public opinion in the United States. Its most
valuable asset in this respect was the Brazilian minister in Washington,
Salvador de Mendonça. Salvador had represented Brazil in the United
States since 1875 and was a well-established and popular figure in
political and social circles in Washington and New York. His loyalty to
the Brazilian republic was indisputable and he worked assiduously to
present his government’s case. In her biography of her husband, Matilda
Gresham noted that the Brazilian minister called almost daily at their
home during the critical period after Saldanha da Gama had joined the
revolt47. The impact of Salvador’s «personal diplomacy» was most
apparent in the Stanton incident and especially in the case of the affidavit
alleging British intrigue to bring back the Brazilian monarchy. In effect,
Salvador was able to tell Gresham personally about the existence of the
affidavit at the same time as Thompson’s telegram on this subject was
Joseph Smith Brazilian Diplomacy and Foreign Intervention in the Brazilian Naval Revolt, 1893-94
130Revista Complutense de Historia de América
2000, 26: 117-134
45 Thompson to Gresham, telegram, 13 December 1893, ibidem.
46 Thompson also frequently expressed anti-British views in his dispatches to
Washington. «It has been very plain to me», he remarked, «that Europeans especially
the English people, sympathize with the revolters and hope for the establishment of a
monarchy upon the ruins of the Republic». See Thompson to Gresham, n.º 150, 1
February 1894, ibidem, vol. 45. The American minister was aware that he was regarded
as being prejudiced against the rebels. Denouncing such views as a «tissue of
falsehoods», he wrote to Gresham: «Espousing the cause of neither side my attitude has
been that of an indifferent spectator». See Thompson to Gresham, n.º 189, 4 March
1894, ibid. Hugh Wyndham, however, once observed that Thompson was «constantly
at the ministry for foreign affairs». See Wyndham to Rosebery, n.º 49, 6 February 1894,
FO 13/724.
47 GRESHAM, Matilda: The Life of Walter Quintin Gresham, 1832-1895, 2 vols.
Rand, McNally. Chicago, 1919, II, p. 777.
arriving at the State Department. The resulting diplomatic activity must
have been pleasing to Salvador because Gresham wrote shortly afterwards
to the American ambassador in London, Thomas Bayard, specifically
mentioning the information given by the Brazilian minister and asking
Bayard to investigate its veracity48.
Salvador did not just lobby Gresham and his many political friends
and associates49. The Brazilian minister also embarked on a personal
publicity campaign sending a stream of letters for publication in
prominent American newspapers in which he emphasized the positive
aspects of the Floriano government while predicting the inevitable
collapse of the revolt. A major public relations success was the
appearance of two articles entitled «Republicanism in Brazil» and
«Latest Aspects of the Brazilian Revolution» in the North American
Review50, a magazine which the Brazilian minister described as «a most
influential publication read by the most eminent men in political life»51.
In these articles Salvador astutely appealed to the well-established
American preference for the republican form of government. «Were the
[Brazilian] republic as bad as its worst enemies paint it», he contended,
«it would still be preferable to any monarchy that could be set up on its
ruins»52. He also singled out the rebel leaders for personal criticism,
accusing Custódio of «personal ambition» and Rui Barbosa of going into
«hiding» at the beginning of the revolt until he was able to flee to
Montevideo. As for the provisional government which the rebels claimed
had been set up in Santa Catarina, Salvador derided it as a «Robinson
Crusoe government»53.
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48 See Gresham to Bayard, 18 December 1893, RG 59, Great Britain, Instructions,
vol. 30.
49 Salvador had a particularly close relationship with the American businessman,
Charles Flint. The latter was instrumental in providing Floriano with a fleet of 12 ships
which arrived at Rio in March 1894. See TOPIK, 1996, pp. 154-77.
50 SALVADOR DE MENDONÇA: «Republicanism in Brazil» and «Latest Aspects of the
Brazilian Revolution», North American Review, 158, 1894, pp. 8-15, 164-74.
51 See MENDONÇA AZEVEDO, 1971, p. 273.
52 SALVADOR DE MENDONÇA, 1894, p. 15.
53 SALVADOR DE MENDONÇA, 1894, p. 171. Rui Barbosa was a leading political
figure who had formerly served as Minister of Finance in the government of Deodoro
da Fonseca. While in exile in Buenos Aires, Rui wrote articles on Brazilian affairs
which were published in the New York Herald. Although he denied active personal
involvement in the Naval Revolt, Rui’s writings were highly critical of Floriano and
military rule.
Less high-profile but similar sterling service for the Floriano
government was being performed in London by the Brazilian minister to
Britain, João Artur de Sousa Corrêa. A professional diplomat, Sousa
Corrêa was described by one British newspaper as «a portly
distinguished-looking gentleman of middle-age, whose geniality and
courteous bearing make him popular in the diplomatic circle». The article
was written in late-September 1893 and also observed that «during the
past few days the Brazilian Legation in Curzon Street has known no idle
moment»54. Like Salvador at the State Department in the United States,
Sousa Corrêa was a busy diplomat and a frequent visitor to the British
Foreign Office during the Naval Revolt. He also had regular meetings
with the British foreign secretary, Lord Rosebery. Their contact was
invariably friendly and even extended to Rosebery showing Sousa Corrêa
the latest telegraphic correspondence sent from the Foreign Office to
Wyndham at Rio55. Further evidence of a personal rapport was
demonstrated when the rumour of Wyndham’s pro-rebel sympathies was
raised in October and Rosebery was quick to inform the Brazilian
minister personally that there was no truth in the allegation.
Consequently, in his dispatches to Rio, Sousa Corrêa was able to reassure
his government that Britain would not «interfere in any way» in the
revolt56. Even when events in Rio took a more critical turn after the
adhesion of Saldanha to the rebel side in December and speculation was
rife that Britain was secretly backing the rebels, Sousa Corrêa was still
able to confirm that the official British attitude of «absolute neutrality»
was unchanged. The Brazilian minister was particularly encouraged by
the content of a speech made by the British prime minister, William
Gladstone, to the House of Commons on 2 January 1894. Gladstone’s
words that «we have no intention, and are advised that we have no right
to interfere in the quarrel» were described by Sousa Corrêa as a
«categorical» statement of British policy57.
While he confidently believed that the British government would
maintain its policy of neutrality, Sousa Corrêa was concerned that a small
number of British newspapers were openly critical of Floriano and
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55 Sousa Corrêa a Felipe Pereira, n.º 36, 22 de setembro de 1893, AHI 217/2/3.
56 Sousa Corrêa a Carlos de Carvalho, telegrama, 2 de novembro de 1893, ibid.
57 Sousa Corrêa a Alexandre Cassiano do Nascimento, n.º 1, 6 de janeiro, AHI
217/2/4. For Gladstone’s speech see Parliamentary Debates, 4th series, vol. 20, 2 January
1894, p. 656.
sympathetic to the rebels. Unfortunately these included The Times, which
he regarded as one of the leading newspapers not only in Britain but in
«the entire world»58. The Brazilian minister described the first editorial
in The Times on the revolt as «violent and unjust to us»59. The
subsequent reports of the newspaper’s Special Correspondent at Rio,
Charles Akers, were regarded as particularly inaccurate and biased60. The
pertinent diplomatic question, however, was whether these articles
exerted influence on the policy of the British government towards the
revolt. One advantage enjoyed by Sousa Corrêa in his dealings with
British officials was that the credibility of Akers was sometimes
undermined by the fact that he had to send his reports by sea mail so that
they often contained information which had become obsolete and
superseded by events. The most critical moment occurred in early-
February 1894. In an article reporting an interview held with Saldanha on
9 January, which was published in The Times on 6 February, the British
correspondent mentioned the admiral’s expectation that troops from the
separatist forces in the south had reached São Paulo and would soon be
approaching Rio. On this occasion the timing of the publication of the
article was significant because it was known that the Foreign Office was
currently giving serious consideration to granting diplomatic recognition
to the rebels. Sousa Corrêa informed the Brazilian foreign ministry that
Rosebery had actually read the article by Akers, but he was gratified to
report that the British government had concluded that the rebels do not
have «the quality of belligerents»61.
The rebel fleet finally surrendered in mid-March 1894 thereby
effectively bringing the Naval Revolt to an end and conceding victory to
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Floriano62. At the beginning of the revolt the foreign representatives at
Rio had automatically arrogated to themselves a superior role and
appeared to take charge as they dictated the precise terms of military
engagement to both Floriano and Custódio. They were soon reminded,
however, that they were dealing with a sovereign state whose leader never
wavered from the policy of insisting that his government be recognized
and treated respectfully. In fact, Floriano directly influenced the policies
and actions of the foreign powers by his success in managing the flow of
information about events at Rio and in ensuring that foreign
representatives, both diplomatic and naval, did not openly sympathize
with his enemies. By contrast, the naval rebels remained in virtual
diplomatic isolation. Moreover, their cause was crucially undermined by
the so-called «neutrality» of the foreign powers which prevented a major
bombardment of Rio and the establishment of a legal blockade to close
the port. Foreign interference was humiliating to Brazilians, but in the
case of the Naval Revolt it was invariably advantageous to Floriano. This
was particularly exemplified by Benham’s naval intervention which,
despite initially arousing Brazilian nationalist sensitivities, actually dealt
a severe blow to the rebels for which the Floriano government was very
appreciative63. But the revolt was not ended by Benham on 29 January.
While the actions of the foreign powers exerted influence on events at
Rio, they only contributed to rather than determined the eventual
outcome. A more significant factor was the combination of firmness and
skilful diplomacy shown by Floriano and his government which not only
constrained the actions of the foreign powers but also succeeded in
turning the Naval Revolt into an unequal contest so that it was only a
matter of time before the rebels capitulated.
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62 Floriano’s term of office came to an end in November 1894 when Prudente de
Morais was inaugurated as the first civilian president of the republic. Saldanha da Gama
joined the rebel forces in the south and was killed in June 1895. Custódio de Melo had
left Rio earlier in December 1893. He withdrew from the conflict and sought political
asylum in Argentina in April 1894.
63 SALVADOR DE MENDONÇA: A situação internacional do Brasil. Garnier. Paris,
1913, pp. 208-9. For the view that there may well have been collusion between the
Brazilian government and Admiral Benham see TOPIK, 1996, pp. 148-51. The affirmations
of friendliness between Brazil and the United States contrasted starkly with Floriano’s
decision to break off diplomatic relations with Portugal in retaliation against assistance
given by Portuguese warships which allowed the rebels to escape from the harbour.
